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Smith: Contracts--Offers and Acceptance--Counter Offers

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CONTRACTs -

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE -

CouNTER O mS.

-

Plaintiff was a West Virginia corporation engaged in buying and
selling coal, with its place of business in Mercer County, West Virginia. Defendant, also a West Virginia corporation, was a coal
operator having its mines in Kentucky. Plaintiff by letter to defendant in Kentucky inquired whether defendant would be interested in an order for 40,000 tons of coal (or, in the alternative,
15,000 to 20,000 tons ("or a similar tonnage .. .. considered in
the nature of a back log") at $1.30 net ton mines to be delivered
"in approximately equal monthly instalments" from date of the
letter until November 15th, about a five-months' period. Plaintiff requested reply by wire. Defendant construed the letter as
an offer and telegraphed at once that it would "accept order
one car daily" over the stated period. The total amount of coal
to have been shipped under this arrangement would have been
6,540 tons. Plaintiff thereupon replied, also by telegram, "Accept
your offer one car daily mailing order." The coal was not delivered in accordance with the contract and plaintiff sued in Mercer County, West Virginia, for breach of contract, recovering
$1,420.83 on a jury verdict. On writ of error, the Supreme Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment, dismissing the case on the
theory that the defendant's plea in abatement attacking the jurisdiction of the court should have been sustained. Three States
Coal Co. v. Superior Elkhorn By-Products Coal Co.'
At common law the action for breach of contract was
transitory and the defendant could be sued wherever he could be
found.! However, by statute, West Virginia has so limited the
transitory nature of this action that under such facts as these it
could be maintained in this state only if instituted in the county
"wherein the cause of action or any part thereof arose."' Consequently, the initial problem facing the court in this case was
that of determining whether the cause of action "or any part
thereof" arose in Mercer County.
The cases are not in accord as to where the cause of action
accruing from the breach of a contract arises. Some hold that it
arises exclusively at the place where the contract was made,' others
1158 S. E. 661 (1931).
22 ANDREws, AmERICAN LAw (1908) p. 1439.
8W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 1, § 2. "An action .... may be
brought in any county wherein the cause of action or any part thereof, arose,
although none of the defendants reside therein, in the following instances;
(a) When the defendant .... is a corporation."
'IMorgan v. Eaton, 59 Fla. 562, 52 So. 305 (1910); Peters v. E. 0. Painter
Fertilizer Co., 73 Fla. 1001, 75 So. 749 (1917) (cause of action held to
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maintain that the place of the breach is, where such cause of action
accrues Still other decisions adopt the theory that the "cause of
action" is divisible, consisting of (1) the contract and (2) the
breach thereof.' West Virginia has long followed the latter rule,'
under which a material part of the cause of action arises both
where the contract was made and where it was breached. Since
both parties admit that this contract was breached in Kentucky,
the only way in which plaintiff could invoke the jurisdiction of
the Mercer County court was to show that the contract was made
in that county..
A contract is made where the offer is accepted.8 An offer
contemplating telegraphic acceptance is turned into a contract
when and w7here the offeree's telegram is delivered to a telegraph
office for transmission,' but an acceptance which varies the terms
of the original offer rejects that proposal and sets up a counter
accrue in county in which letter was written accepting offer to sell) ; State v.
Reid,
177 Wis. 612, 188 N. W. 67 (1922).
5
Penn. L. M. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 25 S. Ct. 483 (1905)
(policy issued in Pa. on N. Y. property; property burned and upon refulsal
to pay insurance it was held the cause of action arose in N. Y., where contract
was breached, even though made in Pa.); N. P. Sloan Co. v. Barhana, 138
Ark. 350, 211 S.W. 381 (1919); Moherstadt v. Harry Newman, Inc., Motor
Cars, 204 Mo. App. 619, 217 S.W. 591 (1920); Lentz v. Evans & Howard
Fire Brick Co., 11 S.W. (2d) 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (suit for breach
of contract for sale of clay; held, the cause of action arose at destination
where buyer rejected shipment there, precluding circuit court of county where
shipment was made from asserting jurisdiction).
0 Graves v. MeCollum & Lewis, 193 S. W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917);
Houston Packing Cotton Co. v. Cuero Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co., 220 S.W. 394
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (suit for breach of contract for sale of oil held
properly brought in county where offer was accepted, under statute permitting suit in any county in which the cause of action or part thereof arose);
Silvers Box Corporation v. Stone & Co., 248 S. W. 1104 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923); State Bank of Beckville v. Mailander, 277 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926);
Arizona Superior Mining Co. v. Anderson, 262 Pac. 489 (1928).
7
Harvey v. Parkersburg Ins. Co., 37 W. Va. 281, 16 S. E. 580 (1892);
Clarke v. Ohio River R. Co., 39 W. Va. 737 (1894); Galloway v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 45 W. Va. 237, 31 S.E. 969 (1898) (application for insurance
from Va. accepted in W. Va. and policy issued thereon in this state; held,
W. Va. contract); Hudson v. Iguano Land & Mining Co., 71 W. Va. 409
(1912); Danser v. Derr, 72 W. Va. 433 (1913); Findley v. Coal & Coke By.
Co., 76 W. Va. 751 (1915). In Jones v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., 84 W.
Va. 248, 99 S.E. 462 (1919), Judge Ritz used the following language: "A
cause of action may ....
be said to consist of an obligation and the breach
....
of that obligation .... the statute uses this language in order to con-

fer8 the jurisdiction in any county in which either of these elements arises."
Hogue-Kellogg Co. v. Webster Canning Co., 22 Fed. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 4th
1927); Galloway v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., supra, n. 7; Nettles v. Gulf
Fertilizer Co., 78 Fla. 490, 83 So. 298 (1919); Bundy v. Commercial Credit
Co., 200 N. C. 511, 157 E. S.860 (1931) (order given in Michigan for acceptance in Alabama became Alabama contract upon acceptance there);
2 WHARTON, CoNPLucT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 422(a); 1 WILLISTON, CO 5 n cTs (1920) § 97.
Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S.344, 26 S.Ct. 688 (1906) ; Watson v. Coast, 35
W. Va. 463, 470, 14 S.E. 249 (1891) (option to be accepted "by wire or
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offer which in turn requires acceptance by the original offeror
before contractual relations arise." In the principal case the
Supreme Court of Appeals held that the defendant had made a
sufficient acceptance. This conclusion was reached on the theory
that plaintiff had set no minimum tonnage and by construing the
words "or a similar tonnage" to include a total which was 8,550
tons less than the smallest amount mentioned in the letter. Under
this view the contract was held to have been made in Kentucky and
consequently no part of the cause of action arose in West Virginia.
It is submitted that plaintiff's letter quite clearly set both a
maximum and a minimum tonnage. This letter offered to purchase 40,000 tons, then stated that if defendant was not inclined to
handle that order, "perhaps you would consider the acceptance of
15,000 to 20,000 tons .... or a similar tonnage." The minimum
is expressly set and defendant's proposal to send less than half
that minimum (a total of 6,450 tons) can hardly be construed as
an unconditional acceptance.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held in a leading
case that an "acceptance" of 1,200 tons of iron rails (the offer
having been for from 2,000 to 5,000 tons) was such a variation from
the terms of the offer as to constitute a rejection of that proposal
and the substitution of a counter offer.' If an "acceptance"
specifying 800 tons less than the minimum stated in an. offer to
sell irons rails converts the offeree's reply into a rejection and
new offer, it would quite naturally seem to follow that an "acceptance" of 8,500 tons less than the minimum named in an offer
to buy coal would have similar legal effect. By this interpretation the contract was made in Mercer County upon plaintiff's
acceptance of defendant's counter offer there, a material part of
the cause of action arose at that situs, and the West Virginia court
quite properly assumed jurisdiction of the suit.
It is therefore submitted that the reasoning of the trial court
was sound and that the plea of abatement to the jurisdiction of the
court should have been denied.
-KINGSLEY

R. SMITH.

otherwise" held turned into a contract upon acceptance by telegram); Barnum Iron Works v. Construction Co., 86 W. Va. 173, 102 S. E. 860 (1920);
C. W. Craig & Co. v. Jones & Co., 200 Ky. 113, 252 S.W. 574 (1923).
10Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 744, 8 S. E. 743 (1888); Barnum Iron Works
v. Construction Co., supra n.9; Crews v. Sullivan, 133 Va. 478, 113 S.E. 865,
867 (1922); Bowers Co. v. Kanawha Valley Products Co., 100 W. Va. 284,
130 S. E. 284 (1925); J. Neils Lumber Co. v. Farmers Lumber Co., 293
Pac. 288 (1920); Carrollton Acceptance Co. v. Ruggles Motor Truck Co.,
253 Mich. 1, 234 N. W. 134 (1931); Morris F. Fox v. Lisman, 237 N. W.
267 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)

§§ 72, 73, 77.

"Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., 119 U. S.
149, 7 S.Ct. 168 (1886).
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